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ABSTRACT 
A Condorcet voting procedure asks each voter to rank candidates in order of 
preference. Then for each pair of candidates, a tally determines which candidate 
is preferred by a majority. The results can be modeled by a tournament where 
nodes represent the candidates and arcs point toward the loser of each two way 
race. If one candidate beats every other candidate, he/she is the winner. If there 
is no such winner, Felsenthal and Machover proposed that the “‘winner” be a 
probabilistic combination of candidates that win at least as often as they lose 
against every candidate. A winner is then picked according to the probabilities. 
This is the unique optimal strategy to a generalized “scissors, paper, and stone” 
game played on the tournament. What is the maximum number of lottery balls 
(the least common denominator of the probabilities) needed to pick a winner 
from n candidates? 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the centuries, many voting procedures have been proposed for 
selecting a winner out of a field of candidates. Perhaps the simplest is 
plurality voting, where the candidate with the most votes wins. This has 
the pathology that a majority of voters could prefer a losing candidate to 
the winner. This can be partially mitigated by initiating a runoff between 
the top candidates. However, this creates it own pathologies in that a 
candidate who would otherwise lose can win by encouraging some of her 
supporters to vote for candidates which she can beat in the runoff. 
Condorcet [l] proposed a voting procedure that has neither of these 
problems. Each voter ranks the candidates in order of preference. Candi- 
date A beats candidate B if a majority of the voters prefer A to B (through- 
out this paper, assume there are an odd number of voters and hence no 
ties). If one candidate beats all others, then she is declared the (Condorcet) 
winner. However, it is possible that the preferences of the majority are not 
transitive even if the preference of each voter is transitive. For example, if 
one-third of the voters rank A first, B second, and C third, one-third rank 
B first, C second, and A third, and one-third rank C first, A second, and 
B third, then a majority would prefer A to B, B to C, and C to A, even 
though it would be inconsistent for a voter to have these preferences. 
What happens if there is no Condorcet winner? The situation can be 
modeled by a tournament with the nodes representing candidates, and the 
arcs showing the results of the two-way contests (let i -+ j denote that 
node i beats node j). Figure 1 is a tournament showing a possible outcome 
for an election with six candidates. 
Felsenthal and Machover [2] proposed looking at probabilistic com- 
binations of candidates. Accordingly, let a fictional candidate be a 
nonnegative real valued function f on the set of candidates V such that 
c f(A) = 1. 
AEV 
In particular, an (ordinary) candidate A is identified with the fractional 
candidate f for which f(A) = 1 and f(B) = 0 for all B E V with B # 
A, i.e., the characteristic function on {A}. Figure 2 shows a fractional 
candidate for the election in Figure 1. 
Associated with any fractional candidate is a random candidate X such 
that for any candidate A, the probability that X = A is f(A). 
A fractional candidate f beats another fractional candidate g if a random 
candidate associated with f wins at least as often as it loses to a random 
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FIG. 1. An election with no Condorcet winner. The arcs show which candidate is 
preferred by a majority of voters (for example, a majority prefer B to A). Notice that 
no candidate is preferred to all other candidates. So there is no Condorcet winner for 
this election. 
FIG. 2. A fractional candidate. Here the fractional candidate is to select candidate 
A, C, or E with equal probability. This fractional candidate beats D with a probability 
of $ and loses to D with a probability of i. So the fractional candidate beats D. It also 
beats all of the other candidates except A. 
90 DAVID C. FISHER AND JENNIFER RYAN 
FIG. 3. The fractional winner. A candidate selected with these probabilities will 
beat any candidate at least as often as it loses. This is the unique fractional candidate 
with this property. 
candidate associated with g. In other words, f beats g if 
c f(&W 2 c f(BM4 
A-+B A+B 
A fractional winner is a fractional candidate that beats all fractional can- 
didates (it is easy to show that a fractional candidate beats all fractional 
candidates if and only if it beats all candidates). Figure 3 shows the 
fractional winner for the election in Figure 2. Notice that a winner (a 
candidate that beats all candidates) is a fractional winner. 
Picking a random candidate associated with the fractional winner is 
the optimal strategy to the tournament game (a generalization of “scissors, 
paper, and stone”) on the tournament created by the voting results. Given 
an arbitrary tournament, two players independently pick a node. If both 
pick the same node, the game is tied. Otherwise, the player whose node is 
at the tail of the arc connecting the two nodes wins. Fisher and Ryan [3] 
and Laffond, Laslier, and LeBreton [5] independently showed that there is 
a unique optimal strategy for any tournament game. Thus, any election 
has a unique fractional winner. 
Laffond, Laslier, and LeBreton showed that the fractional winner is 
monotonistic in that if f is the fractional winner in an election where A 
beats B, and g is the fractional winner in an otherwise identical election 
where B beats A, then f(A) 2 g(A) and f(B) I g(B). 
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FIG. 4. The fractional winner for an election with nine candidates. 
How is the winner of the election then picked? The winner is a random 
candidate associated with the fractional winner (note that this randomness 
is an intrinsic part of the answer, and is not a tie breaker). For the election 
in Figure 3, the outcome could be decided by randomly picking one of 9 
lottery balls: three marked with A, three marked with B, and one each 
marked with C, D, and E. However for the election in Figure 4, we would 
need 183 lottery balls to decide the winner. This is a lot of balls to fit into 
a lottery machine. 
This paper partially answers a question that arises from this procedure. 
Suppose there is an election with n candidates. What is the maximum 
number of lottery balls needed (the lottery number)? 
1. PFAFFIANS AND THE PAYOFF MATRIX 
The derivations in this paper depend on results about the Pfafian of 
a skew-symmetric matrix. Since the concept of the Pfafhan was developed 
almost a century ago and the results of this section are elementary, it is 
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highly likely that they have been discovered before. However, the authors 
have been unable to locate references for the uncited results of this section. 
Given a tournament T on n nodes, let the payoff matrix of T be the 
n x n matrix K(T) whose ij element is 
The payoff matrix differs from the usual tournament matrix. The touma- 
ment matrix A(T) of T is defined be the n x n matrix whose ij element is 
1 if i--+j, 
K(T)ij = -1 if j + i, 
0 otherwise. 
A(T)ij = 
I 
1 if i+j 
0 otherwise. 
Note that K(T) is a skew-symmetric matrix with K(T) = A(T) - A(T)T. 
It is widely known that the determinant of an odd-order skew-symmetric 
matrix is zero. It is less well known that the determinant of an even-order 
skew-symmetric matrix is the square of the Pfaifian of the matrix. For any 
permutation 7r, let 
1 
sgn r = 
if 7r is even, 
-1 if r is odd. 
For n even, let M = {(il, jl), (i2, jz), . . . , (ini2, j,,,)} be a matching with 
ik < jk for all k. Let 
M 
1 2 3 4 ... n-l n 
sgn = sgn 
ii ji i2 j2 ... in/2 
One way to find the sign of a permutation r is to count the inversions: 
the pairs k < e for which rk > ne. If r is the number of inversions in x, 
then sgn x = (-l)T. 
Lemma 1 gives an easier way to find sgn M for a matching M. Two 
matches (ik, jk) and (ie,je) inteTleaVe if either ik < it < jk < je or ie 
< ik < je < jk. Then sgn M can be found by counting the interleaves 
in M. 
LEMMA 1. Let M be a matching with T interleaves. Then sgn M 
= (-1y. 
Proof. Let (ik, jk) and (it, je) be a pair of matches, and assume without 
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loss of generality that k < l. Then 
” . sgnM 1 2k-1 2k ... 2e - 1 2!? ... n = sgn 
ir ‘.. ik j, . . . ie > je ‘a* h/2 ’ 
If these matches interleave, then either ik < ie < jk < je or ie < ik 
< je < jk. This contributes either 1 or 3, respectively, inversions to the 
total. If these matches do not interleave, then either ik < jk < ie < je, 
ie < ik < ‘jk < je, ik < ie < je < jk, Or ie < ‘je < ik < jk . This contributes 
either 0, 2, 2, or 4, respectively, inversions to the total. Adding up over all 
pairs of matches, we see that the number of interleaves has the same parity 
as the number of inversions, and the results follows. ??
For n, even, let M, be the set of all matchings { (ir, jr), (is, jz), . . . , 
(inp,.in/d) with Zk < jk for all k. Then the f’fafian of an n x n skew- 
symmetric matrix K is 
Pf K = C (sgn M)Ki,j,Ki,j, . . . Ki,,2jn,2. 
MEM, 
So we have 
pf [ _8,, “;i2] = al2 
Pf 
and 
Pf 
0 al2 
-al2 0 
-al3 --a23 
-a14 -a24 
0 a12 
-12 0 
-13 -a23 
-al4 -a24 
-al5 -a25 
-16 a26 
al3 
a23 
0 
-a34 
al3 al4 al5 a16 
a23 a24 a25 a26 
0 a34 a35 a36 
-a34 0 a45 a46 
-a35 -a45 0 a56 
-a36 -a46 -a56 0 
al4 
a24 
1 
= 012034 - al3a24 + al4a23, 
a34 
0 
= a12a34a56 - a13a24a56 + a14a23a56 - a12a35a46 + al3a25a46 
-a15a23a46 + a12a45a36 - a14a25a36 + a15a24a36 - a13a45a26 
+a14a35a26 - a15a34a26 f a23a45a16 - a24a35a16 + u25a34u16. 
The following theorem is due to Muir [6, p. 3941. 
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THEOREM 1. Let K be an even-order skew-symmetric mat& Then 
det K = (pf K)2. 
Lemma 2 gives a cofactorlike expansion for the Pfaffian. 
LEMMA 2. Let K be an n x n skew-symmetric matrix where n is even. 
Then for all i, we have 
pf(K) = c(-l)i+jKij pf K[i,j] - c(-l)i+jKij pf K[i,j], 
j<i j>i 
where K[i,j] is the matrix formed by deleting rows i and j and columns i 
and j from K. 
Proof. Each matching can be written so that i is in the first matching 
i.e., so that either il = i or jl = i. Then since Kji = -Kij, we have 
i-l 
pf K = C C (sgnM)KjiKi,j, * . . Kin,ljn12 
+ C C (sgnM)KijKi2j2 . . . Ki,,2j ,2 n 
j=i+l MEMn 
(j.%)EM 
i-l 
= - C Kij C (sgn M)Ki,j, ’ . . Kin12jn12 
j=l MEMn 
(r,j)EM 
n 
+ C Kij C (sgnM)KjiKi2j, ‘.. K’ %%/2in/2. 
j=i+l MEMn 
(J,OEM 
For each inner sum, all possible matchings of the elements which are not 
i nor j are considered, just as in pf K[i, j]. We need to show that we 
correctly account for the signs of these matchings. If i - j is even, there 
are an odd number of integers strictly between i and j. So there must be 
an odd number of matchings that interleave with (i, j) or (j, i). If i - j 
is odd, there are an even number of integers strictly between i and j. So 
there must be an even number of matchings that interleave with (i, j) or 
(j,i). Either way, sgn[M - (i, j)] = -(-l)i+jsgnM, and the result then 
follows. W 
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If T is a tournament on n nodes, then Fisher and Ryan [3] showed that 
rankK(T) = 
n - 1 if n is odd, 
n if n is even. 
If n is odd, Theorem 2 gives an explicit expression for the null vector of 
K(T). Let T* be T with an additional node (a new node 1) which beats 
all other nodes. Thus, 
w*) = [ _: &)I. 
Then we have the following. 
THEOREM 2. Let T be a tournament on n nodes where n > 1 is odd. 
Let x be the unique null vector of K(T) satisfying lTx = 1. Then 
Xi = (-1) i+1 Pf K(T) [il 
pf K(T*) ’ 
where K(T)[i] is th e matrix formed by deleting row i and column i from 
K(T). 
Proof. Let K(T)i be the ith row of K(T). Let 
0 
Bi = K(T)T 1 -K(T)( K(T) ’ 
Since rows 1 and i + 1 of Bi are identical, and Bi is an even skew-symmetric 
matrix, pf Bi = dm = 0. Using Lemma 2 on the first row of Bi gives 
pf Bi = K(T)il pf K(T)[l] - K(T)iz pf K(T)[2] +. . . + K(T)in pf K(T)[n]. 
Therefore 
K(T){pfK(T)[1]-pfK(T)[2]pfK(T)[3]-pfK(T)[4]...pfK(T)[n]T = 0. 
Using Lemma 2 on the first row of K(T*), we have that 
pf K(T*) = pf K(T)[l] - pf K(T)[2] 
+ pf K(T)[3] - pf K(T)[4] + . . . + pf K(T)[n]. 
Thus the entries of the vector defined as in the statement of the theorem 
sum to 1. ??
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2. THE LOTTERY NUMBER 
FISHER AND JENNIFER RYAN 
We now address the question: What is the maximum least common 
denominator in a fractional winner on an n node tournament? Let L, be 
the answer to the question. Fisher and Ryan [3] enumerated all fractional 
winners on seven or less nodes. This showed that L1 = Lz = 1, L3 = L4 = 
3, LS = L6 = 9, and LY = LB = 35. They also showed that the fractional 
winner of a tournament T is the null vector (where entries are positive 
and sum to one of a potential submatrix of K(T). A straightforward argu- 
ment using Cramer’s rule and Hadamard’s inequality gives that L, 5 nni2. 
However, this seems absurdly large (e.g., L7 5 73.5 M 907.4927). 
Theorem 3 uses the Pfaffian to get an upper bound for L, that is roughly 
the square root of the Hadamard-type bound. The values of the fractional 
winner are fractions of the form in Theorem 2, and the least common 
denominator of the values (the lottery number) is at most ]pfT*], where 
T is a subtournament of T (equality sometimes does not occur because of 
cancellation). Thus for n odd, L, is at most the maximum of ]pf TI over 
all tournaments T on k nodes, where k is an even number with k 5 n + 1. 
Lemma 3 gives us a bound on the Pfaffian of a skew-symmetric matrix. 
LEMMA 3. Let A be a k x k real skew-symmetric matrix whose entries 
are at most 1 in absolute value. Then pf A 5 (k - 1)“j4. 
Proof. Since the diagonal entries of A are 0, the diagonal entries of 
ATA are at most k - 1, and hence trace (ATA) 2 (k - 1)k. Thus the 
eigenvalues of ATA (which are real and nonnegative) sum to at most (k - 
1)k. Since det(ATA) is the product of the eigenvalues, we have det (ATA) 5 
(k - l)k. So from Theorem 1, 
pfA = &&i = dz 5 dm = (k - l)k’4. 
??
Is Lemma 3 exact? Suppose A is a k x k real skew-symmetric matrix 
whose entries are at most 1 in absolute value with pf A = (k - 1)“j4. Then 
the diagonal entries of ATA are k - 1, and hence the nondiagonal entries of 
A are either 1 or -1. Further, the rows of A are orthogonal. Hence, A+1 is 
a skew-Hadamard matrix (a k x k matrix of l’s and -1’s with HT + H = 21 
and HTH = kI). It is conjectured that a k x k skew-Hadamard matrix 
exist for k = 1,2, and when k is a multiple of 4 (they are known not to 
exist for all other k). This conjecture is known to be true for all k < 188 
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(W. Wallace [7]). So the above question is at least as difficult as a classical 
unsolved problem. 
As per the discussion at the start of this section, we then get the fol- 
lowing bound for the lottery number. 
THEOREM 3. For odd n, we have L, 5 n(n+1)/4. 
The bound given in Theorem 3 can be improved. The reason is that can- 
cellations occur, especially with regular tournaments. For example when 
n = 7, Theorem 3 gives L7 5 49. But for a tournament T on 7 nodes, 
pf K(T*) = 49 only occurs for regular tournaments. Since the fractional 
winner on a regular seven node tournament has f(A) = + for all candi- 
dates, the lottery numbers is 7. In fact, the maximum lottery number for 
tournaments on seven nodes is 35, and the lottery number of a regular tour- 
nament on n nodes is n. We can do a little better in the case of nonregular 
tournaments. 
LEMMA 4. Let T be a nonregular tournament on n 2 5 nodes, where 
n is odd. Then pf T* 5 n(n-3)/4dm. 
Proof. Since T is not regular, there is a vertex i of T whose indegree 
is greater than its outdegree. Since n is odd, the indegree must be at least 
2 greater than its outdegree. Therefore, the (1, i + 1) and the (i + 1,1) 
entry of K(T*)TK(T*) are equal and at least 2. So K(T*)TK(T*) has a 
principal submatrix (rows and columns 1 and i + 1) of the form 
SC n a [ 1 a n 
where a 2 2. Since the eigenvalues of S are n + a and n - a, and the 
eigenvalues of a principal submatrix are between the largest and small- 
est eigenvalues of a symmetric matrix, K(T*)TK(T*) has an eigenvalue 
that is at least n + 2, and another that is at most n - 2. Further, since 
K(T*)%(T*) = -K(T*)’ and K(T*) has pure imaginary eigenvalues 
that occur in conjugate pairs, K(T*)TK(T*) has at least two eigenval- 
ues that are at least n + 2, and at least two that are at most n - 2. 
Using that trace[K(T*)TK(T*)] = (n + 1)n is the sum of the eigenval- 
ues, we have that det [(K(T*)TK(T*)] 5 n+‘(n + 2)2(n - 2)2. Thus 
pf K(T*) 5 n(n-3)/4dm. R 
THEOREMS. For any odd numbern 2 5, we have L, 5 n(n-3)/4dm. 
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How good is the bound in Theorem 4? As mentioned in the beginning of 
this section, Fisher and Ryan [3] found L, for n 5 8. They also showed that 
a fractional winner must be the null vector of a principal submatrix on an 
odd number of nodes. So for ail m, we have Lzm = L~,,+I. An exhaustive 
search shows that Lg = LEO = 183, which is exact for the tournament in 
Figure 4. A random search found an 11 node tournament with lottery 
number 979. Its payoff matrix and fractional winner are 
K(T) = 
0 1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 -1 
-1 o-1 1 1 -1 1 1-l 1 1 
-1 1 0 1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 
1 -1 -1 o-1 11 1 1 -1 -1 
l-l 1 1 0 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
1 1 -1 -1 1 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 
1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 0 -1 -1 1 1 
-1 -1 l-l 11 10 1 -1 1 
-1 1 -1 -1 1 1 1 -1 0 1 -1 
-1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 -1 0 -1 
1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 0 
and 
NullK(T) = A(161 143 105 105 99 99 69 55 53 53 37)? 
The random search also revealed a 13 node tournament with lottery number 
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4635. Its payoff matrix and fractional winner are 
K(T) = 
and 
0 1 -1 -1 l-l 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 
-1 0 1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 
1 -1 0 1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 
1 -1 -1 0 1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 
-1 -1 l-1 0 1 1 -1 1 l-l 11 
1 1 -1 1 -1 0 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 1 
-1 -1 -1 l-l 10 11 1 1 -1 1 
-1 1 1 -1 1 1 -1 0 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 1 1 -1 1 
1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 0 1 1 -1 
-1 -1 1 1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 o-1 1 
1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 -1 1 0 -1 
-1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 1-l 1 0 
NullK(T) = &(555 547 457 455 433 391 389 365 307 299 179 131 127)T. 
Table 1 compares the bound in Theorem 4 with the largest known 
values for the lottery number. For an n node tournament T where n is 
odd, pf K(T*) is the sum of 1 x 3 x 5 x . . . x n terms each of which is 1 
or -1. So L, must always be odd. So the bound from Theorem 4 can be 
rounded down to the nearest odd integer. 
As seen in Table 1, Theorem 4 is not a vast overestimate of the lottery 
number, but there is room for substantial improvement. 
It is easy to construct infinite families whose lottery numbers grow 
exponentially with the order of the tournament. The best construction 
that the authors could find is to take the 13 node tournament with lottery 
number 4635 and replace the node having numerator 127 with a copy of 
the tournament connecting each of the 13 new nodes to the 12 old nodes in 
the same manner as the replaced nodes (since 4635 and 127 are relatively 
prime, we need not worry about cancellations). This produces a 25 node 
tournament with lottery number 4635’. Continuing this process for all 
k > 0 gives a tournament with 1 + 12k nodes with lottery number 4635”. 
Hence when n = 1 (mod 12), we have L, 2 4635(‘+l)/” > 0(2.02n). 
However, the upper bound in Theorem 4 for the lottery number of an n 
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TABLE 1. 
THE BOUND IN THEOREM 4 VERSUS THE LARGEST KNOWN LOTTERY NUMBER. 
Maximum lottery number for Upper bound 
n an n node Tournament from Theorem 4 
1 or 2 1 1 
3 or 4 3 3 
5 or 6 9 9 
7 or 8 35 45 
9 or 10 183 235 
11 or 12 2 979 1307 
13 or 14 >4635 7827 
node tournament grows superexponentially with n. An interesting project 
would be to find a family of tournaments whose Lottery numbers grows 
superexponentially with the order of the tournament or to show that no 
such family exists. 
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